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Study ofthecausesofeconomicgrowthsincethe industrial revolutionhashighlighted
the importance of technological development in long-run economic dynamics.
This interpretation of long-period growth has come to the fore in the applied
literature, andrecentlyalsointhe theoretical literature whichreprises Schumpeter’s
theories of the …rsthalfofthe1900s. Oncloserinspection, however, this interpretation
is incomplete because it fails to consider the origin of technological advancement,
namely the progress of science. Historians and scholars of science, in fact, stress
the concomitance between the appearance of important scienti…c discoveries and
the transition from a period of slow productivity growth to that of exponential
expansion which led up to the contemporary age.
Thealliance betweenbasicresearch, technology and growthhasbeen particularly
close and fruitful since the nineteenth century. Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986;
1990) argue that economic miracle of the Western world can be explained by
the marked increase in science’s ability to investigate the secrets of nature since
the end of the 1800s. This greater e¢ciency of basic research was initially due
to important changes in its organization and closer interaction with the rest of
society andwiththeeconomy. The creationofinstitutions to host and remunerate
scientists was accompanied by the increasing specialization of research work into
departments and the emergence of norms within the scienti…c community which
regulated its activity.
1The period saw the founding of prestigious journals which collected and
disseminated the results of scienti…c inquiry. The peer reviewing of articles
allowedthe objectiveassessment of theproductsof researchandenabledscientists
to receive recognition from their community in terms of prestige.The spread of
experimental research work in equipped laboratories favoured closer interaction
between scienti…c research and technological research which generated radical
innovations and strong growth of productivity.
In this chapter we put forward an analytical approach to economic growth
which tries to capture the essential features of the interaction between the work
of the scienti…c community and long-period economic activity.
Thetraditionaltheory of growth, whichoriginatedwithSolow(1956), considers
the academic worldtobeexogenous with respect totheeconomy. Asinthecase of
otherpublic goods, the production of knowledge is the task of thestate. Advances
of basic research and those of applied research constitute Solow’s ’residual’ -
the unexplained part of the growth of per capita output. Exceptions in this
theoretical tradition are the works of Karl Shell (1969, 1970), in which the
productionof knowledge is endogenous. In this model, the state collects resources
from the activities of private agents in order to …nance basic research, which is
the public input to the private sector. The economic problem analysed by Shell is
essentially that of the dynamic allocation of resources between the production of
goods and the production of knowledge. Still largely unexplored in the economics
literature is the scienti…c research sector in relation to its forms of organization
2and the incentives - economic and otherwise - which motivate those who work in
it.
With the advent of ’endogenous growth theory’ - the new scienti…c paradigm
for the analysis of growth - innovation has become a central topic of inquiry.
The works of Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Grossman and
Helpman (1991) have generated a rich Schumpeterian strand in growth theory
which draws heavily on the microeconomic literature on industrial innovation
in which innovative …rms get a patent that prevents others from pro…ting from
new knowledge. These models, too, relegate the production of new opportunities
for technological progress to a residual domain exogenous to the economy. The
case of growth models with general purpose technology is emblematic of the
limitations of this approach. GPTs, in fact, are radical changes in technologies
which improve production possibilities in a wide range of sectors. These changes
should certainly be associated with scienti…c advances which alter the constraints
to which technologies are subject, but there is no trace of this phenomenon in
these models.
The in‡uence of scienti…c advances on technological innovation, and on the
productivity of economic systems, has been the subject of applied inquiry for a
number of years. The studies by Mans…eld (1991, 1995) are based on surveys of
…rms’ opinions onthe importance ofscienti…c advances for innovation in products
and processes. The …rst study was based on a sample of 76 of the largest USA
…rms and foundthat in theperiod 1975-1985 around 11% ofnewproducts and 9%
3of new processes could not have been developed without the results of academic
research conducted in the previous …fteen years.
An equally direct approachhas beenusedby Adams(1990), who estimates the
contribution of scienti…c knowledge to productivity growth in 18 manufacturing
sectors. The main feature of this study is its meticulous construction of an
indicator of the stock of scienti…c knowledge obtained by considering both the
number of publications in scienti…c …elds closest to the sector’s technology since
the 1930s, and the scienti…c personnel employed in the sector.
Another strand of studies consider the spatial e¤ects of research spillover on
the innovative activities of …rms. Among the most important of these studies
is Ja¤e (1989), which considers data on corporate patents in each state of the
USA. The estimation of a model of simultaneous equations shows that there
are important spillover values for academic research, especially in the cases of
pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries.
Inspiteofscant growththeory dealingwithbasic research, economists (Arrow,
1962; Nelson 1959) have long concerned themselves with the world of scienti…c
research. Indeed, the studies of the past two decades have given rise to what
has been termed the ’economics of science’ (see Stephan, 1996). This comprises
the numerous empirical works that have investigated the connections between
scienti…c production and technological innovation, as well as those which study
the labour market of scientists. Recently, a number of theoretical analyses
have shown the substantial di¤erences between the activities of basic research
4and those of technological innovation. Dasgupta and David (1987; 1994) have
constructed a theoretical framework - still highly general and open - with the
components essential for the analytical representation of the production of basic
knowledge.
In this framework, the state organizes the scienti…c sector because the output
from scienti…c research is considered to be a public good because of its non-
rival nature and because of the full disclosure rule adopted by researchers when
they obtain new results. The ’quest for priority’ as the essential motivation of
researchers is a decisive aspect of the theory imported from the sociology of
science (Merton, 1957). Researchers compete against each other for rewards,
which take the form - in the case of success - of important publications and
the consequent advantages in terms of income, prestige and reputation. Hence,
unlike the objective of those who work in applied and technological research, that
of scientists is to achieve the widest possible circulation of their …ndings, rather
than secrecy.
In these winner-take-all contests there is great uncertainty over the outcome,
and the problem of incentives is particularly acute because of the di¢culty of
monitoring e¤ort. Actually, academic researchers also earn a certain wage that
provides incentives for e¤ort in research that otherwise could be too low as a
consequence of uncertainty. Teaching also provides a source of income alternative
to research. The literature on academic researchagrees that the incentives system
prevalent in the sector e¢ciently motivates workers, so that problems of shirking
5are rare.
The organization of work in academic research is strongly characterized by
di¤erent forms of cooperation and knowledge-sharing, albeit in the presence of
strictly personal goals and …erce competition. In fact, there are several informal
sources of externalities in basic research. Scientists share and confront their ideas
while talking with other scientists, or in seminars. This is one reason for the
assignment of prestige to academic departments. Furthermore, peer evaluation
and reciprocal recognition of the value of discoveries are forms of externalities
which closely in‡uence the productivity of individual researchers.
The model analysed in this paper represents the working of an economy
which consists of agents who may choose to work either in the goods production
sector or in scienti…c research. These two economic activities are organized
according to di¤erent objectives and rules. Research is …nanced by the state out
of taxes, and its output is a public good that bene…ts all …rms and improves their
productivity. Researchers are engaged in competitions with other researchers for
a new discovery. The probability of a new …nding by a researcher is a function
of his/her e¤ort, and his/her interactions with other researchers. Our model
has a strong focus on scientists incentives. In fact we assume three forms of
reward. In each race in basic research the state rewards with a prize only the
winner, and this monetary prize lasts until the arrival of a new discovery. Every
scientist also receives a …xed salary that does not depend on e¤ort and success
in research. The third type of reward is nonmonetary as it concerns prestige and
6social status, a relevant determinant of e¤ort in basic research. We propose such
an incentive scheme in order to account for the main features of scientist work.
In fact, even though the quest for priority makes e¤ort very high, it must be
considered that scientists have a guaranteed salary that may reduce the negative
e¤ects on incentives of such winner-take-all contests. Furthermore, scientists who
win a race cannot ”rest on their laurels” because science goes on andnew…ndings
may make obsolete the previous.
This model produces some interesting results concerning the e¤ects of the
organization of science sector on economic growth. Among the main results
of the analysis of the model are the possible existence of multiple steady state
equilibria that can usefully characterize advanced countries and undeveloped
countries. Non-monetary incentives to work in basic research, as social prestige
and conformity, may induce high e¤ort and foster economic growth, even if their
e¤ects are not straight. Public policices aimed at enlarging the science sector
should balance the positive e¤ects of higher prizes and salaries to scientists with
the negative e¤ects on the private sector.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section surveys the theoretical
literature on the relationship between science and economic growth. The third
section sets out the basic theoretical model. The fourth section analyses the
model’s equilibrium solution.
72 The economics of science
Arrow’s 1962 essay laid the basis for the economic analysis of the production
of and the demand for knowledge; analysis that was subsequently developed
with reference to technological innovation. In the very general terms of Arrow’s
analysis, the various forms that knowledge canassume are likened to information.
According to Arrow, on the supply side, once knowledge has been produced
it can be transmitted at a cost considerably lower than that necessary for its
production. On the demand side, information has the characteristic of non-
rivalry in its consumption, because its use by one individual does not reduce the
quantity available for consumption by another individual. These two features
of knowledge make it similar to a public good - all the more so the greater the
degree of excludability in consumption, which cannot be perfect.
Arrow’s articlepromptedDasgupta andDavid(1987)toinvestigatethe fundamental
di¤erences betweenthe production of knowledge in the institutions of science and
technology. This important essay laid the basis for the modern economic theory
of science. The main di¤erences between the worlds of science and technological
innovation reside in their organization and the goals pursued. The fundamental
di¤erence between science and technology concerns the dissemination of results,
which is immediate and complete in scienti…c research as academic researchers
seek to publish their discoveries as soon as possible and obtain, through peer
evaluation, recognitionby thescienti…ccommunityof the validity oftheirresults.This
8iscontrary towhat happensintechnological researchwhere newknowledge is kept
secret..
The scienti…c community on the one hand enjoys the advantage of complete
information; on the other, it is concerned to ensure the researcher’s property right
on the item of new knowledge that s/he has produced. Because full disclosure
is the optimal solution from the point of view of society’s well-being, this social
norm adopted in the scienti…c community serves that purpose. Obviously, full
disclosure con‡icts strongly with the secrecy necessary to be able to pro…t from
technological innovation. Firms, in fact, obtain a return on investments in R&D
inrelationtothedegreeofmarket power that apatent orthe restrictedcirculation
of an innovation may generate for them. Radically di¤erent from this objective is
the ’quest for priority’ in attribution ofthe paternity ofa discovery that motivates
academic researchers. The latter immediately submit the results of their work for
publication which will certify their priority in the discovery. From this derives
recognition in monetary terms (career advancement, awards, etc.) and in terms
of reputation and prestige in the scienti…c community.
The incentives system that operates in research is characterized by great
uncertainty and by the principal’s di¢culty of monitoring e¤ort. The evolution
of state-organized academic research seems to have struck a balance between the
private motivations of researchers and the needs of society. Individual scientists
take part in contests in which those who obtain an innovative result …rst receive
recognitionfromthescienti…ccommunity andtheadvantages that ensure therefrom.
9Because the work of those who do not win is valueless, the contest belongs to the
category of tournaments in which the winner takes all (Dasgupta, 1989; Lazear,
1997). Comparison with reality shows that this system e¢ciently incentivizes
academic researchers, in that they are generally highly motivated and committed
to their research. In e¤ect, this result also derives from the assurance of an
income, often from teaching duties, which mitigates the e¤ects of the risk in
research.
The rules of the academic world favour the spread of forms of collaboration
and information-sharing which have important externalities. Work in academic
departments is characterized by forms of knowledge sharing and ideas’ discussion
as seminarsandmimeocirculationandalsoby severalinformal ways ofexternalities
in everyday life interactions. The transmission of tacit knowledge takes place in
academic departments whose composition is an important factor in the work
of individual researchers. This relationship may also hold among researchers
belonging to di¤erent institutions but who work in the same …eld and interact
with each other to form ’invisible colleges’ (David, 1998). Furthermore, scienti…c
work is often carried out by teams of researchers, in that the advantages deriving
from obtaining priority are generally indivisible, while the pooling of kindred
and specialized skills considerably increases the chances of success (Stephan and
Levin, 1992). Data on publications show that collaborations have increased over
time.
Externalities in knowledge production have been analyzed by Carraro, Pomè
10andSiniscalco(2001)in amodelthat concernsarace betweenacademicresearchers
and researchers in private …rms to a speci…c discovery with possible commercial
use. This paper shows under what conditions the coexistence of Science and
Technology institutions can be welfare maximizing.
The topic of incentives for academic researchers also relates to the aggregate
size of the scienti…c research sector compared with that of technological research
and the economy in general. From a long-period perspective, scienti…c knowledge
is a crucial input to technological innovation. Consequently, in the long period,
it is necessary for a balance to be struck between the incentives for scienti…c
research work and the economic advantages in technological research increased
by innovations.
3 The Economy
A class of growth models that can be used to represent the salient features of
the science sector described in the previous sections comprises so-called neo-
Schumpeterian models. Here we follow the framework of Aghion-Howitt (1992)
in which there is no capital accumulation.
In our economy there is a continuum of individuals, of measure 1, who can
…ndemployment in oneof twodi¤erent sectors: one is a competitive consumption
good sector, the other is the basic research sector which produces the body of
knowledge used in the production process of the …nal good. Manufacturing …rms
11are owned by all agents in the economy, and labour and capital markets are
perfecly competitive. The state owns and organizes the science sector.
Each individual has an in…nite life-span and is characterised by one (identical
for all agents) intertemporal utility function of consumption and e¤ort required
by the job performed. The intertemporal preference rate, r > 0, is constant and
in equilibrium coincides with the rate of interest at which …rms collect savings.
Time is indexed by t, while the state of knowledge is indexed by k.




with 0 < ® < 1 , where lkt denotes the number of specialised workers used at
time t and Rk is a technological parameter which measures the productivity of
the basic knowledge freely disposable in the technological era k.
In this economy, innnovationconsists in the birthof a newbody of knowledge,
k + 1, produced in the science sector, able to increase the productivity of …nal
good workers by a constant parameter ° > 1: That is to say, as common in
Shumpeterian growth models, we assume that:
12Rk = °k (2)
Consequently k denotes the type of basic knowledge and the technological
era that comes to an end with a scienti…c discovery and the introduction in
manufacturing ofaninnovation. Becausethe parameters thatde…ne theeconomy,
and therefore the choices made by the agents, remain constant during each
technological era, henceforth we can simplify the notation by omitting the time
index t when it is not indispensable.
3.1 Science sector
Science sector in this economy produces the new basic knowledge which is a
public good freely disposible for the production of the …nal good. As is well
known, public good production usually involves strong problems with workers’
incentives and e¤ort. In our model, this issue is crucial since new knowledge
production - hence economic growth - depends on e¤ort of scientists. Actually,
as Robert Merton (1957) pointed out, the science sector has developed a reward
system particularly complex and e¢cient based on both a recognition mechanism
and a monetary reward which provide strong incentives to the production and
dissemination of knowledge by enhancing in the same timethe productivity of the
best and most original scientists. Moreover, monetary reward and social reward
13interact in an important way through the norms which regulate the working of
the academia.
The main characteristic of the academia is the high value attached to the
priority of discovery. As a consequence of the norm of ”priority” in scienti…c
discoveries researchers compete in contests to be the …rst who introduces an
innovation, and be rewarded by the scienti…c community
In this ”winner take all” contest, the prize has a multidimensional nature,
giventhatitconsists ina monetary reward andin ahighesteemor peer-recognition
whichusually takes theformofhonori…c awards, memberships inhonori…c societies
or in prestigious departments. The monetary reward is funded by the State,
while the esteem derives from peer recognition in the form of citations of their
work, invitation to speak at important gatherings and awards. Scientists are not
interested in recognition received from external agents, rather what they want is
recognition from their peers1.
Formally, in each instant t, the bene…ts deriving from being an innovator,
vk+1;t; are:
vk+1;t = mk+1;t + Pk+1;t (3)
1David Raup (1986) coined the phrase ”saganization” to describe the loss of professional
reputation that a scientists su¤ers after receiving continued mass media attention.
14where mk+1 is the monetary reward while Pk+1is the social reward, both gained
when innovation occurs and therefore gained in the technological era that follows
that when the research activity is carried out. Moreover, since there can be only
one winner a time, both types of prize will last untill a new innovation and a new
tchnological era arrives.
Thesocial prestige deriving from innovation is given by the following function:
Pk+1 = '(nk+1)P0Rk+1 (4)
where P0 is a parameter and '(nk+1) represents the recognition function, which
increases as the size of the research sector rises, evenif at a decreasing rate. More




with 0 < ¯ < 1:
In other words, we assume that social prestige is positively related to the value
of innovation introduced and, since it depends on the peers recognition, prestige
increases if the latter increases.
In this model innovation is uncertain and, following the literature on patent
15races, weassume that the probability that asingleresearcher obtains aninnovation
depends on the e¤ort that he devotes to the research actitivity, and follows a
poisson stocastic process with a parameter given by:
µ(xk) = µxkt +µhxkt (5)
where xk is the e¤ort employed by the scientist in the research activity, xk is the
average e¤ort of the research sector, and µ > 0 and h > 0 are two parameters.
Equation indicates that the poisson parameter, which gives the probability that
a single researcher innovates, depends positively upon the e¤ort of scientist and
upon the average e¤ort of the whole research sector. While, as concerns the
probability that an innovation occurs in the economy, we have : µnk(xk +hxk):
The hypothesis of externality e¤ects on ”productivity” of a single researcher
captures the role of colleagues, which is of a paramount importance in doing
science.
Goodscience is doneincommunities ofscientists andofteninteams. Cooperation
in science extends far beyond team players, regardless of wheather they are team
members, scientists talk with other scientists, share ideas, discuss one another
work. This occur in informal way and in formal presentations of seminars and
papers. The interchanges that result from such discussions can make spectacular
di¤erences in science. The importance of colleagues goes beyond the boundary of
16theparticular institution with which the scientist is a¢liated, since the productive
scientist is also likely to belong to an ”invisible college” (David, 1998), a group
of scientists who share common interests, and meet formally and informally to
exchange ideas. These ”invisible colleges” play a signi…cant role in science by
furthering knowledge and establishing research agenda.
The importance of the group externalitites is enhancedalso by the rules which
govern the academia, in fact the rule of priority induces to exchange ideas in
order to obtain as early as possible the recognition of others, in other words, it
works the rule of ”full disclosure” (Dasgupta and David, 1994) that increases the
interconnections among researchers and the externalities e¤ects.
To capture such important aspects we have assumed that the productivity
of a single researcher depends not only upon his own e¤ort but also upon the
e¤ort put in the research activity by his colleagues, rapresented by the average
e¤ort of the scientists group. We use the average e¤ort since it better represents
the intellectual and psychological resources of others to which scientist may have
access, which are relevant not only for their quantity but rather for their quality.
Given the above hypothesis the total expected bene…ts deriving from being
an innovator are:














The rule of priority assures that the prize is obtained only by the innovator,
but this implies that the losers of a scienti…c race receive absolutely nothing.
This is a problem because in this case the rule of priority places all the risk of
innovation activity on the shoulders of scientists and this cannot be e¢cient. To
overcome this problem usually the scientists’ payment schedule consists not only
of the prize for being the winner of scienti…c competition, but also of a ‡at salary
which is received just for entering science. Often this salary is connected with
some other activity not directly linked to research (for example teaching).
Inorderto capturethis important characteristicofscientists’incentivescheme,
we assume that the researcher receives a …xed salary Fk; funded by the state,
obtained only for entering the science sector, which lasts untill the individual is
in the science sector.
Scientists to obtain scienti…c output use essentially cognitive resources and
e¤ort, in particular the latter is very important since it is strongly related with
the motivation, the dedication to do science and therefore with the cognitive
resources. Mary Frank Fox (1983), a sociologist of science, notes that certain
18investigations have shown that ”productive scientists, and eminent scientists
especially, are a strongly motivatedgroup of researchers” and have the ”stamina”
or the capacity to work hard. Empirical data on scientists do suggest that high
performers are absorbed, involved and strongly identi…ed with their work. This
implies that psychological variables and motivation to do science may interact
with the capacity to bear high level of e¤ort by reducing the disutility deriving
from it. In other words motivation to do science makes less costly to work hard.
Motivation to do science is also related to the social recognition and to
the comparison with own colleagues. Scientists who stay in highly motivated
environment, wherethere is anhighidenti…cationwiththescience and an ”ethics”
of work, attach an high social esteem to collegues who bestows an high level of
e¤ort in their activity.
In order to consider this dimension of the reward from doing science, that
linkes social interactions and the degree of application of human resources, we
assumethatthe cost ofe¤ort, expressedinterms of utility, is reducedbyreputational
e¤ects, which rises the motivation to do science. More particularly, we have
assumed that social esteem of a researcher is higher, harder he works with respect
to his colleagues. Formally the cost of e¤ort (c(x;x)) is:
c(xk;xk) = Rk[dxk ¡ s(xk ¡ xk)]
1+¾ (8)
19with ¾ > 0:
Moreover we assume that (d ¡ s) > 0: This assumption assures that social
esteem is not so high to make convex the utility function (i.e. to make c(xk;xk) <
0):
Giventheabove hypothesis thetotal expectedbene…ts derivingfrompartecipate






Vk+1 + Fk ¡ Rk [dxk ¡ s(xk ¡ xk)]
1+¾¤
dt (9)
3.2 The consumption good sector
In the consumption good sector each worker can supply inelastically one unit
of labour factor, and there is no disutility connected with work. Given these






r + nk(µxk + µhxk)
(10)
where wk is the wage obtainable in that sector.
Consumption sector receives technology from the research sector at no cost,
but it pays taxes that the state uses to fund the research sector. Considering the
production function (1) and bearing in mind that this sector operates in perfect
20competition, pro…ts net of taxes are de…ned as follows: ¼ = (1 ¡ ¿)Yk ¡ wklk,
where ¿ denotes the tax rate. Maximization of this function yields the wages in
the consumption good sector, as given by:
wk = (1 ¡¿)®Rkl
®¡1
k : (11)
3.3 The public sector
The state levies taxes, ¿Yk; on the consumption good sector in order to …nance
production of knowledge by the research sector. The …nancing consists in an
amount of monetary income which is distributed only to those who win the
scienti…c discovery contest. We have repeatedly emphasised, in fact, that the
income of researchers working in the public sector consists of a share connected
with innovative activity - i.e. a reward paid only if innovation is produced -
and a share which is instead independent of production of innovation, and which
shelters researchers against the risk of not producing any innovation.
Given these hypotheses, we have:
mk = ¿1Yk (12)
fknk = ¿2Yk (13)
21where ¿ = ¿1 + ¿2; and ¿1, ¿2 represent the shares of private income that go to
…nance the prize of scienti…c races and to the …xed salary of researchers. Hence,
the state’s budget constraint can be represented as follows:
mk + fknk = ¿Yk (14)
4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this economy is de…ned by both the optimal level of e¤ort that
each scientist puts inthe research acitvity and in the optimal number of scientists
that are allocated to the science sector.
The optimal level of e¤ort undertaken by scientists, xk, maximizes the present
net value of the total expected bene…ts deriving from doing research. We assume
that a scientist does not have a strategic behaviour so that she does not consider
the e¤ect of her e¤ort on the arrival rate of discoveries in the economy. In this
case, the maximization of the total bene…ts gives rise to the following …rst order
equilibrium condition:
µ(mk+1 +Pk+1)
r + nk+1µ(xk+1 + hxk+1)
¡ (d ¡ s)(1+ ¾)Rk[dxkt ¡ s(xk ¡ xk)]
¾ = 0: (15)
22According to equation (15), each researcher chooses the optimal amount of e¤ort
by equating the expected discounted marginal bene…t of one more unit of e¤ort
to the marginal disutility that derives from e¤ort, in which the negative e¤ect of
higher e¤ort is weakened by stronger status in the scienti…c community.
The optimal choice of e¤ort depends on nk+1, the dimension of science sector.
Sinceindividuals canchoose, withoutsustaining costs, toparticipate inthe labour
market either as workers in the consumption sector or as researchers inthescience
sector, in equilibrium the maximum utility yielded by the two types of activity
should be the same. By equations (9) and (10) we have the following equilibrium
condition for the labour market:
Vk+1 + Fk ¡ Rk [dxkt ¡ s(xk ¡ xk)]
1+¾ = wk (16)
Given that individuals are homogeneous, equilibrium will be simmetric, which
implies that xk = xk: Finally, inequilibrium all individuals …nd employment, then
we have: nk + lk = 1:
The analysis of dynamic equilibrium derives from the last three equilibrium
conditions. Firstly, from equilibrium conditions eq. (15) and eq. (16) we are able
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By the above expression, we can note that x(nk) is increasing and, in order
to have a positive value of e¤ort, the dimension of science sector must be greater
than a threshold: nk > ¿2
®(1¡¿ 1)+(1¡®)¿2 ´ n. More, the optimal choice of e¤ort
goes to in…nity as n ! 1.
From the above condition we can see that the component of total reward
not linked to the innovation- i.e. the ‡at salary- may have a perverse e¤ect on
the level of e¤ort. Hovewer this perverse e¤ect can be compensated by a high
reputational reward deriving from being a strongly motivated scientist.
Another result that emerges is the positive relation between the optimal level
of e¤ort and nk. This relation can be explained by the fact that as the size of
science sector increases, wage in the consumption sector, which is the alternative
sector, also rises, while the …xed salary is reduced, by reducing at the same time
the perverse e¤ect of this latter on the scientists’e¤ort.
Simpleexercisesofcomparativestatics onequation(17)allowus toanalyse the
e¤ects that some relevant parameters have on the optimal level of e¤ort directly,
i.e. without the consideration of indirect e¤ects which work through variations
in the size of science sector. The results are summarized by the following:
Proposition 1 Given employment in science sector nk, the equilibrium level of
24e¤ort of researchers xk:
² increases as status e¤ects - s - become stronger;
² decreases when externalities - h - and the share of resources invested by the
state in the research activity - ¿1;¿2 - are higher. The negative e¤ect of ¿2,
the …xed salary component of scientists income, is stronger than the e¤ects
of ¿1.
Proof. It follows trivially from simple partial derivatives with respect to
¿1;¿2;h;and s;by considering nk constant:
As expected, the status variable has a positive direct e¤ect on the level
of e¤ort, while concerning the direct e¤ects of externalities and of the state
resources, the results of Proposition 1 seem to be counterintuitive. However
they can be explained by considering that externalities reduce the period during
which a successful scientists can enjoy her prize. As far as the e¤ect of public
funds to research is concerned, we have to consider that the wage received in
the alternative sector will be reduced by an increase in ¿1 and ¿2 and, given
the labour market equilibrium condition, this reduces also the reward to all the
specialized workers. It can be noted that parameters concerning prestige do not
a¤ect e¤ort, but later it will be clear that they a¤ect employment in science n.
However, these are only partial e¤ects that do not take into account the
indirect e¤ects which work through the induced variations of the optimal number
of individuals that in the technological era k are employed in the science sector.
25To …nd these latter we substitute equation (17) in equation (16) obtaining the
following di¤erence equation in the variable nk:
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As in Aghion and Howitt’s model, equation (18) enables us to determine the
amount of labour employed in the science sector in era k as function of the labour
employed in the successive technological era. Unlike in Aghion and Howitt’s
model, however, the relation between nk and nk+1 is not univocal. Indeed, while
£(nk)- themarginal coststhat derives frominvestinghumanresources inresearch
activity- is always increasing in nk;the function ª(nk+1) - the marginal bene…ts-
is shaped as an inverted U, with a …rst trait increasing and then decreasing. An
26increase in the number of researchers has an ambigous e¤ect on the bene…ts. In
fact, increasing the number of scientists on the one hand reduces the monetary
reward obtainable from innovation and the period during which it lasts, while on
the other it increases the peer recognition and the prestige obtainable from the
innovation. Given that:
@£(nk)
@nk 6= 0, we can apply the implicit function theorem
and de…ne the di¤erence equation that sinthesizes the economy dynamics:
nk+1 = ¡(nk):
A steady state equilibrium is de…ned as a value of n such that n = ¡(n): From
equation (20) it is straightforward to verify that the marginal costs deriving from






Moreover, £(nk) is concave in a …rst trait and then convex. While the function






This implies that equation nk+1 = ¡(nk) may be characterized by either one
steady state equilibrium or three steady states equilibria, of which two stable and
one unstable.
More precisely we have the following results:
27Proposition 2 If there is a …xed component in the total reward of scientist (¿2 >
0), there always exists a positive numberof workersthat in steadystate equilibrium
are employed inscience sector. If social prestige deriving from scienti…c discoveries
(¯P0) is su¢ciently high and
µ°¿1
r is su¢ciently low, there may be three steady
states two stable and one unstable. Otherwise only one steady state equilibrium
exists. A unique equilibrium is also a stationary solution of nk+1 = ¡(nk) if
prestige does not a¤ect researchers preferences.
Proposition2 states that the presence of a …xedsalary toscientists is su¢cient
to rule out the possible existence of a no-growth trap where there is no science
sector. While if the monetary reward is too low and prestige is high enough,
the model dynamics can show multiple steady state equilibria. In this case, the
economy dynamics could converge to di¤erent steady states, one in which a large
share of employment in the scienti…c sector makes social prestige high and high
incentives attract workers in basic research; the other, that may characterise low
developed economies, in which the scienti…c sector has lower dimension due to
less monetary incentives and low social prestige. Multiple steady states are a
more likely outcome of the model when social prestige enters preferences with
increasing importance.
If the role of social prestige in scientists preferences is not signi…cant then
multiple steady states may disappear and the economy may be characterized by
only one steady state balanced growth path.
28In order to derive the e¤ects of some relevant parameters on the steady state
value of scientist employment, we concentrate on the case of a single steady state
and we assume that it is stable. After some algebra we are able to state the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 Let us consider the unique stable steady state, n, of nk+1 =
¡(nk), then employment in the science sector, n :
² increases with an increase of the share of public resources devoted to the
sector, ¿1, ¿2;
² increases with an increase in importance of prestige of researchers, P0;¯;
² decreases with weight of status in the utility function, s, if parameterssatisfy
this condition: d ¸
s(¾¡1)(1+¾)(1+h)
(¾¡1)(1+¾)(1+h)+1;
² increaseswith the importance of externalitiesin basic research, h, if parameters
satisfy the following condition d ¸ ¡
s¾(1+h)
1¡¾(1+h).
Some interesting comments can be done on the statements of this proposition.
Public policies aimed at the enlargement of the science sector can be realized by
collecting more resources form the private sector that will be channelled to higher
prizes for scienti…c discoveries and/or to higher …xed salary of researchers. These
kind of policies improve the monetary reward of doing basic research. Strong
e¤ects on the size of science sector may derive from changes to the importance
29of non-monetary components of reward. In fact, it can be easly appreciated the
positive e¤ect of social prestige of joining the world ofscience. This e¤ect accords
with both common sense and a large part of sociological literature dealing with
science.
The same literature stresses the peculiar features of the scienti…c community
in which the disutility of work is lower than other jobs because of several positive
factors. Amongthemost important isfeeling ofstatusandsocial esteem. According
to Proposition 3 the importance of status may reduce the equilibrium dimension
of science sector. In fact, we must consider that this e¤ect is direct on e¤ort x,
hence increasing e¤ort might induce a lower number of workers to choose basic
research.
A similar e¤ect on n is the one that derives from stronger externalities of
average scientists e¤ort on the individual probability of success in scienti…c races.
In this case, e¤ort decreases with the parameter h, as always happens with
external e¤ects, andthesamemotivationcanbe put forwardforthe samenegative
e¤ect on n. In both cases externalities mean that individuals do not fully consider
bene…ts that derive from their choices.
4.1 Long run growth and comparative statics
In our economy, production of the …nal good increases only when an innovation
occurs, and this is a probabilistic event. The expected average steady state
30rate of growth depends on the number of researches employed in science, on the
productivity of these workers, on the optimal level of e¤ort and on the magnitude
of the technological advance brought about by the innovation. In particular we
have:
E(g) = E(lnYt ¡lnYt¡1) = µx(n;s;h;¿1;¿2)(1+ h)nln° (21)
Parameters that in‡uence the equilibrium number of scientists and their
oprimal level of e¤ort, also a¤ect either directly and indirectly the growth rate
E(g). Then a simple exercise of comparative statics on equation (21) gives us the
e¤ects of these parametes on the size of science sector and on the steady state
growth rate. In fact we have:
@E(g)
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Taking into account comparative statics results concerning e¤ort and n at steady
state, we are able to write the following
Proposition 4 The growth rate ofoutput at steady state increaseswith parameters
¯; P0 that concern prestige in the utility function. The e¤ect of parameters
s;h;¿1;¿2 on the growth rate depends on the relative strenght of two opposite
e¤ects on e¤ort and scientist employment. In particular:
² an increase of ¿1;¿2;h decreases e¤ort but increases employment n;
In these cases E(g) is positively a¤ected by parameters if e¤ort does not
react too much in comparison with the reaction of employment;
² an increase of s increases e¤ort but decreases employment.
In this case E(g) is positively a¤ected by social status parameter s if it
strongly stimulates e¤ort while reducing employment.
This proposition gives us a picture that highlights the role that science sector
may have in economic growth. Focus is on rules and norms that prevail in
this world and may di¤er substantially in hystorical esperiences of the most
industrialized countries. It also summarises some important results of the paper.
32In this model two forces drive the production of new knowledge and economic
gowth. Oneisindividual choiceofscientistswhotake part of acomplexorganization
inwhich incentivesderive not only frommoneyincome butalsofromthecommunity
rules. The other is the collective choice made by all agents from wich the relative
size of science sector derives. The monetary incentive to work in basic research
has both an individual and an aggregate dimensions, since the second concerns
the distribution of physical resources between the two sectors of the economy.
From thepoint ofviewofimmaterialincentiveswe distinguishthreecomponents.
Social prestige depends on howmany peers can evaluate researchdone by a single
scientist. It does not a¤ect e¤ort, but has an in‡uence on the decision to join
or not the science sector. If the scienti…c community is especially generous and
e¢cient in awarding prestige, the science sector will be greater and economic
growth stronger.
A di¤erent kind of social inteaction is captured by the search for status
and conformity. This e¤ect concerns e¤ort that scientists put in their job in
comparison with e¤ort of the others and it provides a motivation for individual
researchers. The point is that by increasing e¤ort, conformity increases also
disutility of work in science and may have a negative in‡uence on employment in
science.
Externalities of average e¤ort of scientists a¤ect the individual probability of
obtaining a new …nding and represent the third context e¤ect in science sector.
As usual, externalities in production lower the individual incentive to e¤ort, but
33cause increasing returns on aggregate activities. This seems to happenalso in our
model and the result of externalities on growth depends on the relative strenght
of these two contrasting e¤ects.
5 Conclusions
This paper represents the…rst attempt tothe modelling ofbasic research and long
runeconomicgrowthsincework done by Karl Shell inthe late sixties. As common
inthe framework of endogenous growth models, we provide a formalization of the
interactions between the scienti…c sector and the rest of the economy which work
both ways. Focus is on the complex organization of basic research that includes
both monetary and non monetary incentives. The state organizes production of
new knowledge - a public good - with resources taken from the private sector.
Scientists compete each other to get a priority over a discovery and these races
are a¤ected by several forms of social interactions. In fact, scientists informal
interactions give rise to externalities that hasten discoveries. Also scientists join
the science sector to enjoy high social prestige and their behaviour is in‡uenced
by a bias towards conformity and status. All these forms of incentive in our
model become important determinants of scientist e¤ort and of the size of the
sector in comparison with the rest of the economy. Given that science is …nanced
by taxes taken from private …rms, output growth and structure of basic research
activity jointly determine the dynamics of the economy. This dynamics are not
34trivial as multiple steady state equilibria can derive from strong e¤ects of social
inteactions in science.
Here we set the main lines for the analysis of such an important issue for
long run growth that in future work we will further develop in order to deal with
welfare issues and public policy.
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